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Antitrust litigation often involves challenges to vertical 
“control,” and in a variety of situations.1 The problems are driven by 
one question: how does a firm injure competition by limiting the 
behavior of vertically related entities? Competitive injury includes 
harm to consumers, labor, or other suppliers from reduced output and 
higher prices. The affected entities are either “upstream” firms and 
persons, including labor, that supply the firm in question, or else 
“downstream” firms or persons that purchase from it.  After an early 
period of antagonism toward vertical control, antitrust courts 
subsequently shifted to a very benign position.2 Even today, however, 
antitrust law lacks a unified theory about how vertical relationships 
can harm competition. 
For horizontal combinations such as cartels or mergers of 
competitors, the competitive threats have been robustly theorized.  
Horizontal agreements or mergers reduce the number of effective 
rivals in a market, making collusive outcomes including higher prices 
more likely.  In extreme cases they may even create a monopoly.  By 
contrast, a vertical merger or contract does not reduce the number of 
firms in any market or give any participant a larger market share.  For 
example, if five firms manufacture shoes and ten firms retail them, a 
vertical merger or exclusive selling agreement between one 
 
*James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Carey 
Law School and The Wharton School. 
1 On antitrust policy concerning vertical integration by dominant 
firms, see 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶755-769 (4th ed. 2016); on vertical mergers, see 
4A Id., Ch. 10 (4th ed. 2016); on vertical contractual restraints by 
firms that are not necessarily dominant, see 8-11 Id., Chs. 16, 17, & 
18 (4th ed. 2017-2018).  
2 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: 
NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970, at 220-242 (2015). 
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manufacturer and one retailer still leaves all five manufacturers and 
ten retailers remaining and may not even change their market shares. 
Vertical “control” refers to situations in which a firm does 
more than simply purchase from or sell to someone else in a one-off 
transaction that leaves the parties free to engage in all other business. 
Among the possibilities are vertical mergers, in which one firm 
acquires a vertically related firm,3 or vertical integration by contract, 
in which the parties agree to longer term relationships that come with 
other restrictions.  The contractual relationships come in a large 
variety, and this has complicated legal analysis.  Among the varieties 
are arrangements in which one firm agrees to deal exclusively in the 
other’s products (exclusive dealing),4 one firm agrees to take 
combinations of two or more products from the other firm (tying),5 a 
firm promises that the terms it offers others will be less favorable, or 
at least no more favorable, than the terms given to the contracting 
party (most-favored-nation, or MFN, agreements).6 There are also 
variations or combinations of these, including several that involve 
conditional discounts or rebates rather than outright prohibitions.7 
Many earlier antitrust decisions involving vertical market 
control exhibited deep suspicion of vertical ownership or contractual 
devices that a firm operating at one market level might use to control 
 
3 See 4A AREEDA HOVENKAMP, id.. 
411 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 18 (4th ed. 2018). 
59 & 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW, Ch. 17 (4th ed. 2018). 
63B PHILLIP E AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶768a6 (4th ed. 2015) (monopolistic MFN clauses); 11 id., ¶1807b1 
(as a form of quasi-exclusive dealing). 
7Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which applies to exclusive dealing and 
tying, expressly includes discounts and rebates.  15 U.S.C. §14 
(2018) (applying to “discount from, or rebate upon” the prohibited 
condition). 
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output or dealing at a second, upstream or downstream, level.8  Some 
decisions feared monopolistic “leveraging,” or the idea that a firm 
that had a monopoly in one product could use a vertical agreement 
such as tying to extract additional monopoly profits in a second 
product.9 
More recently the emergent theory of competitive harm has 
been some version of “foreclosure,” or the idea that a restrictive 
vertical agreement can exclude competitors or at least severely limit 
their opportunities.  Under this model vertical practices are often 
considered to involve distinct upstream and downstream markets.10  
 
8For vertical mergers and ownership, see United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (considering vertical integration 
between movie production companies and movie theaters, ultimately 
resulting in consent decree); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 
U.S. 218 (1947) (condemning acquisitions by Checker a taxicab 
manufacturer, and taxicab operating companies); United States v. 
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 170 (1911) (divesting vertical 
ownership between producers of tobacco and wrapping foil for 
tobacco products); United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co, 234 F. 964 
(S.D.N.Y. 1916) (condemning corn sugar makers’ control of candy 
market).  On contractual vertical restraints, see Dr. Miles Medical co. 
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 273 (1911) (“The right of 
alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general 
property in movables, and restraints upon alienation have been 
generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy, which is best 
subserved by great freedom of traffic in such things as pass from 
hand to hand.”).  Fifty years later, see United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co, 388 U.S. 365, 378 (1967) (“…the decree should be 
revised to enjoin any limitation upon the freedom of distributors to 
dispose of the Schwinn products, which they have bought from 
Schwinn, where and to whomever they choose. “). 
9E.g,, Carbice Corp. of Amer. v. American Patents Development 
Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33-34 (1931) (tying as patent misuse); 
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.392 (1947) (tying as 
antitrust violation). 
10E.g., Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Comm’n, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 
(2009) (vertical price squeeze: “upstream market” for wholesale 
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Foreclosure typically occurs when the restraint covers a large enough 
percentage of one of these markets to make the entry or survival of 
independent competitors less likely. 
Foreclosure analysis focuses on two questions about potential 
harms to competition: first, does the defendant have sufficient power 
in one of the markets to create and enforce this restraint?,11 and 
second, does the challenged practice tend to cut off, or foreclose, a 
sufficient amount of competition in the vertically related market?12 
A much more benign theory of vertical control, developed by 
Chicago School writers such as Robert Bork and Richard Posner, 
severely limited foreclosure concerns. For them, vertical agreements 
were almost always competitively harmless and should be legal.13  
Their thinking was heavily influenced by Ronald Coase’s idea that a 
vertical contract is nothing more than a substitute for an internal 
production decision.14 For example, the automobile maker could 
either manufacture its own engine blocks or else buy them from 
someone else.  While that decision had no consequences for 
 
production of digital services and “downstream market” for retail 
sales); Paladin Assocs., Inc. v Montana Power co., 328 F.3d 1145 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (tying involving upstream market for tying product and 
downstream market for tied product); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United 
States, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991) (vertical refusal to deal, 
upstream market for airline flight reservation systems controlled by 
airlines in downstream market). 
11 E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) 
(30% not enough). 
12 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) 
(foreclosure too small when considering the entire geographic market 
for coal).  On Tampa, see discussion infra, text at notes __. 
13ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH ITSELF, CHS. 11, 14-15 (1978); Richard A. Posner, The Next 
Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se 
Legality, 48 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981). 
14 Ronald H Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 
(1937). 
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competition, self-production might lead to lower transaction costs.  
Further, when firms do things internally, they usually do so 
exclusively.  If Ford decides to build its own engine blocks rather 
than purchase them, it typically will not go into the business of 
selling them to rivals.  So why should an exclusive contract be 
treated any differently? 
Harm to competition from a vertical merger or exclusive 
contractual restraint is not automatic.  As one extreme it might do no 
more than re-align buyers and sellers after subtracting out those firms 
that are removed by an exclusive arrangement.  At the other extreme, 
a vertical merger or exclusive contract could completely cut off 
producers of the vertically related product.  For example, if the only 
hospital in a town used a merger or exclusive contract to procure 
anesthesiology services through a single firm, the effect could be to 
dry up that town’s remaining market for anesthesiology services.  As 
a general matter one cannot practice anesthesiology without a 
hospital and there are no alternatives left. By contrast, if the same 
hospital should enter an exclusive agreement with a plowing 
company for snow removal, the arrangement would simply remove 
one customer from the snow removal market.  Here, however, the 
hospital makes up only a small part of the market for snow removal 
and the remaining plowing firms would go right on competing for 
everyone else. 
The Vertically Related “Market” 
Antitrust analysis has historically estimated market power by 
reference to the market share of a defined “relevant market,” from 
which it draws inferences about a firm or cartel’s ability to charge a 
monopoly price.15  In vertical cases courts also assess “foreclosure” 
at the upstream or downstream level by considering the range of 
buyer or seller alternatives to the contracting firms. 
 
15See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW, Ch. 5 (5th ed. 2021) (in press). 
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  This “foreclosure” question differs from the market power 
question, however.  Its focus is not on the power to set high prices, 
but rather on the number of firms who can act as alternatives to the 
allegedly foreclosed firm. While courts considering vertical practices 
sometimes speak of upstream and downstream “markets,” they do not 
mean the same thing in the two contexts.  The Government’s 2020 
Vertical Merger Guidelines acknowledge this difference by changing 
the terminology. They speak of a primary market but a “related 
product” to refer to the vertically related firm or firms.16  The fear is 
of higher prices in the primary market, which is facilitated by some 
form of foreclosure or other injury that occurs in the related product. 
As a general matter, the threat in the level containing the 
related product is not higher prices. Often it is just the opposite.  For 
example, when a dominant firm merges with or enters an exclusive 
contract with a downstream firm the resulting foreclosure may enable 
the dominant firm to increase its prices.  But the remaining rivals in 
the downstream market will often end up earning less or in some 
cases be excluded from the market altogether.  For this reason, 
foreclosed rivals are often the plaintiffs in private antitrust challenges 
to vertical restraints or mergers.17 
 
16U.S. Dept. of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Vertical 
Merger Guidelines §3 (“VMG”) (June 30, 2020), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-
justice-federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-
guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf (“A related 
product is a product or service that is supplied to or controlled by the 
merged firm and is positioned vertically or is complementary to the 
products and services in the relevant market.”) 
17 E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) 
(tying; challenge to hospital’s exclusive contract with 
anesthesiologist, brought by competing anesthesiologist); ZF Meritor, 
LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012) (exclusive dealing; 
foreclosed competitors’ challenge to exclusive agreement in market 
for heavy duty transmissions).  See also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793733
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The Supreme Court confronted the question of available 
alternative trading opportunities, or foreclosure, in its Tampa Electric 
decision.18 An electric utility located in northern Florida built a new 
generation facility that burned coal.  It entered into a traditional 
common law requirements contract to purchase all of its coal needs 
for 20 years from Nashville Coal at an agreed upon price. The market 
price of coal later increased, making the price in the requirements 
contract unfavorable to the coal company.  In order to get out of it, 
the coal company filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that 
the agreement, which bound the coal company to provide the utility 
with all of its coal needs, foreclosed competing coal producers.19  As 
a result, the coal company argued, the contract violated the Clayton 
Act’s prohibition on exclusive dealing contracts that 
anticompetitively preclude a selling firm from dealing with 
competitors.20  Today an antitrust lawsuit under that theory would be 
dismissed under the “antitrust injury” doctrine.  Whatever its status 
under the state law of requirements contracts, as far as competition 
policy was concerned, Nashville Coal was the beneficiary rather than 
the victim of the exclusive coal agreement.21  It was the other coal 
producers who were being injured. 
The Supreme Court ruled against the coal company, but not 
on that ground. Rather it looked at the geographic range over which 
Nashville and other coal companies sold coal.  While the coal 
covered by the contract was a significant percentage of coal sales in 
Tampa Electric’s purchasing area (Florida and Georgia), Nashville 
Coal and its predecessors were located in Kentucky and Tennessee.22  
 
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (vertical merger challenge by 
competitor of acquired downstream firms). 
18Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). 
19See id. at 321. 
2015 U.S.C. §14 (2018). 
21On “antitrust injury,” see 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶335, 337 (5th ed. 2021). 
22See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168 F. Supp. 456 (M. 
D. Tn. 1958). 
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If one looked over the entire area between the buyer and seller there 
were many coal producers and many coal purchasers.  Of these, the 
challenged utility contract covered less than 1 percent of sales.23 
Since Tampa Electric the courts have tended to measure 
foreclosure by looking at the entire range of potential trading partners 
who might be plausible alternatives to the entity for which 
foreclosure is claimed.24 They have settled on foreclosure 
percentages in the range of 30%-40% as the minimum needed for 
illegality.25  But this narrow focus misses a variety of possible 
competitive harms from vertical exclusion.  In some cases, the 
exclusive agreement may not exclude a firm altogether, but may raise 
 
23Tampa, 365 U.S. at 333 (finding maximum foreclosure of .77 
percent). 
24E.g., Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852 (1988) (pathologist’s objection to 
hospital’s exclusive dealing arrangement with another pathologist 
should be tested in a national market in which hospitals recruit 
pathologists, not the market into which the hospital sold its own 
services); Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793 (2d Cir. 1994) (relevant 
market is area in which anesthesiologists competed for jobs; here, 
hospital solicited contracts from anesthesiologists in several states); 
Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1233–35 (8th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988) (in contract for provision 
of car washing equipment to service stations, relevant market for 
determining foreclosure was the entire national market for car wash 
equipment of various types). 
25See Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Rhode Island, 373 F.3d 57, 68 (1st Cir. 2004) (“For exclusive 
dealing, foreclosure levels are unlikely to be of concern where they 
are less than 30 or 40 percent”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 
F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999), 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 
(D.D.C. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 253 F.3d 34, 
70 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001) (roughly 40% to 
50% foreclosure necessary under §1).  See 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶1821 (4th ed. 2019) (summarizing case law on 
minimum requisite shares for unlawful exclusive dealing). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793733
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its costs in a way that facilitates monopoly pricing.26  In other cases it 
may make a price increase profitable by changing bargaining 
relationships.27 
Proper analysis of vertical control arrangements has 
unfortunately been hindered by the Supreme Court’s conclusion in 
the AmEx case that if a vertical practice is involved market power can 
be established only by reference to a relevant market.28  Although 
there are some workarounds, this can make the competitive effects 
question much more difficult to answer, particularly in markets for 
differentiated producers or products.29 
Notwithstanding AmEx, antitrust analysis is increasingly moving 
away from methodologies for assessing power that require a market 
definition, and toward alternatives that look directly at output 
responses to price changes, or at the effect of certain practices on 
bargaining relationships.30  The problem with market definition is its 
utter inability to deal with any degree of differentiation in either 
products or geography.  Once we have defined a relevant market, all 
of the firms inside that market are treated as if they are perfect 
competitors, which means that they are regarded as having infinitely 
 
26See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
27See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
28 Ohio v. American Express, 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2285 n.7 (2018).  On 
methodologies for assessing market power, including market 
definition and alternatives, see discussion infra, text at notes __.  In 
Amex, the government had sought to prove market power both 
indirectly, by reference to a relevant market, and directly by 
reference to price-volume relationships.  The district court had found 
a relevant market for general purpose credit and charge card 
purchases, in which AmEx had 26.4%, as against Visa’s 45% and 
MasterCard’s 23.3%.  It also found direct evidence.  See United 
States v. American Express Co., 88 F.Supp.3d 143, 188-189 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
29See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust 
Economics, B. U. L. REV. (2021) (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3508832.  
30 See Id. 
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high substitutability from one to another.  By contrast, if a market is 
defined so as to exclude a particular firm, that firm is treated as if it 
does not compete at all.  This approach cannot begin to pick up the 
complex array of situations in which firms bargain with one another. 
Metering Foreclosure 
Foreclosure occurs when a vertical merger or exclusive contract 
provision denies market opportunities to rivals.  For example, if a 
city has ten appliance retailers and an appliance manufacturer either 
purchases or enters an exclusive dealing agreement with one of them, 
there are still nine remaining retailers through which competing 
appliance manufacturers can sell.  If the manufacturer should make 
such deals with all ten, however, then competing manufacturers 
could not retail in that town, except perhaps by building their own 
retail stores.  Several factors are relevant to determining foreclosure, 
including the number of sellers of the related product, their relative 
sizes, the number that have been made inaccessible by a vertical 
restriction, and the difficulty of establishing new ones. 
Consistent with the theory of relevant markets, the traditional 
approach to foreclosure would treat the ten retail stores in the 
example above as identical in product offerings, although not in size, 
which is essential for computing overall foreclosure as a percentage 
of the market.  This approach subjected foreclosure theory to a 
criticism popularized by the Chicago School that the profit 
maximizing price of a good does not change simply because one firm 
also comes to own the retailers.31  That would do no more than force 
manufacturer substitution from one store to another.  But that 
classical foreclosure theory ignores many lessons from marginalist 
economics, one of which is that in equilibrium only the marginal 
retailer earns competitive returns.  Other retailers have lower costs 
and will earn more.  Yet others may have had higher costs, but they 
will have exited from the market. 
 
31See Robert H. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The 
Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 
157 (1954) (criticizing “leverage” theory of tying and exclusive 
dealing). See Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical 
Integration: Leverage, Foreclosure, and Efficiency, 79 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 983 (2014). 
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This rather conventional observation about marginal market 
participants drives the rationale for theories of RRC, or raising rivals’ 
costs.  As a result, it is difficult to see why some people objected to 
it.32  The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines acknowledge the theory 
and supply some illustrations.33 
Traditionally, the foreclosure resulting from a vertical merger (or 
other arrangement) was measured against the full range of firms 
selling in the market where foreclosure was feared. That was the 
procedure that the Supreme Court followed in the Tampa Electric 
case.34  It counted up all the coal sellers in the geographic range 
covered by the transaction and concluded that the challenged contract 
covered less than one percent of this.  Significantly, the market was 
coal, a commodity, and the Court did not trouble itself with questions 
about product differentiation, differences in quality, or differential 
production costs. 
Once we consider the role of marginal and inframarginal firms, 
the “market definition” question changes, or at least acquires a 
change in focus.  It is no longer particularly important to know the 
full range of vertically related sellers.  For example, suppose the 
related product is differentiated from one firm to the next, or that the 
firms that produce it have different costs or are more or less desirable 
for some other reason.  In that case it is much less important to know 
all of the firms in the market than it is to know whose behavior is 
constrained by the challenged arrangement, and who are that firm’s 
closest rivals. 
Suppose, for example, that the ten retailers in the allegedly 
foreclosed market have markup costs ranging from 20 to 30.  In 
competitive equilibrium the higher cost firms will just barely stay in 
business while the lower cost ones will earn a profit.  In that case a 
vertical merger or exclusive contract with the lowest cost firm could 
 
32E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 196 (2d ed. 2001) 
(RRC “not a happy formula”). 
33VMG, supra note __, §4a. 
34See discussion supra, text at notes __.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Competitive Harm from Vertical Mergers, __ REV. INDUS. ORG. 
(2021) (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3683386.  
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relegate rival manufacturers to dealing with the higher cost retailers.  
With the lower cost firm taken out of the mix, the equilibrium price 
charged by the remaining sellers would be higher. 
In order to perform this analysis, we would not have to define the 
market for the retailers.  We would merely need to identify those that 
were the most desirable from the upstream parties’ point of view.  
Both the Vertical Merger Guidelines and some of the case law permit 
this approach.35 The better placed trading partners could be those that 
are geographically closest if transportation costs are important, or it 
could be those that employ superior and more cost-effective 
technologies or produce more desirable products. 
In Qualcomm, for example, the district court observed that 
Qualcomm, a dominant producer of modem chips for cellular phones, 
procured an exclusive agreement to supply chips to Apple, thus 
excluding Intel. Apple was the most desirable customer and 
Qualcomm did not wish for Apple to be purchasing from two 
different suppliers.36 Apple, by contrast, wanted the two modem chip 
suppliers to be competing with one another so that it could obtain 
more favorable terms.37 Qualcomm responded by refusing to supply 
chips to Apple’s newest devices unless it obtained an exclusive 
 
35See, e.g., VMG, supra note __, Example 2 (vertical merger 
obtaining the best sources of oranges and relegating others to more 
costly oranges).  See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 
34, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Microsoft's actions foreclosed Netscape's 
access to the most efficient distribution channels); United States v. 
Dentsply Intl., Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191-192 (3d Cir. 2005) (exclusive 
dealing imposed on dealers relegated rivals to more costly and less 
effective distribution channels). See also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 505 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1276 
(2008) (refusing to dismiss claim that Microsoft's exclusivity 
practices relegated plaintiff to inferior distribution channels).  By 
contrast, see Omega Env’l, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 
1162-1163 (9th Cir. 1997) (treating all distribution channels alike; 
dismissing complaint). 
36FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F.Supp.3d 658, 736 (N.D.Cal. 2019), 
rev’d, 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020). 
37411 F.Supp. 3d at 736. 
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deal.38  The District Court found this conduct unlawful, but the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, concluding that the only serious competition for 
Apple’s business was with Intel.  It even conceded that the result of 
its exclusive arrangement with Apple was very likely higher prices.  
It faulted the district court for identifying the relevant harm as 
accruing to Qualcomm’s customers, “resulting in higher prices to 
consumers,” rather than Qualcomm’s competitors.39  The Ninth 
Circuit apparently believed that injury to customers fell outside of the 
relevant market and that only injury to competitors counted.40 
What the Ninth Circuit should have seen is that this dispute 
involved two well-placed suppliers (Qualcomm and Intel) with a 
single large customer (Apple) who was naturally attempting to force 
competition between them.  Instead, Qualcomm took advantage of its 
dominant position to insist on exclusive dealing.  Affirming liability 
should have been straightforward, particularly given the fact finding 
that prices were higher as a result. 
Already in the 1916 American Can case the defendant, who was a 
dominant maker of metal food cans, bought up or acquired exclusive 
deals covering all of the superior can making machinery.  This 
relegated rivals to inferior technologies: 
[F]or a year or two after defendant's formation it was 
practically impossible for any competitor to obtain the most 
modern, up-to-date, automatic machinery, and the difficulties in 
the way of getting such machinery were not altogether removed 
until the expiration of the six years for which the defendant had 
bound up the leading manufacturers of [can-making] 
machinery.41 
When considering foreclosure from a vertical practice a fact 
finder must focus less on the overall range of alternatives and more 
on the relative placement and quality of the acquired or contracting 
firm vis-à-vis the most closely competing alternatives.  It is not 
 
38 Id. at 737-738. 
39Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 992-993. 
40Id. at 1002. 
41United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 875 (D. Md. 1916), 
appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921). 
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necessary to define the “market” for these firms overall, but the fact 
finder must identify the closest rivals. To the extent the defendant’s 
vertical practice ties up the lowest cost or best of the related 
producers, rivals will be relegated to those that are inferior. As a 
theory of harm, raising rivals’ costs is more likely than complete 
market exclusion, although the latter is possible too.  Optimally, the 
fact finder could use expert testimony to determine the equilibrium 
price effects on the defendant and the vertically related firm, and also 
of rivals attempting to compete with it. 
Market Definition and Direct Measurement: “Recapture” 
 Whenever a firm raises its price it will, ceteris paribus, lose 
some sales.  Whether the price increase is profitable depends on the 
size of the price increase, the firm’s margins, and the number of sales 
that it loses.  If the firm can recapture some of these lost sales, then a 
price increase of any given magnitude will be more likely to be 
profitable. 
The idea of “recapture” has become an essential component 
of modern economic analysis of market definition, as well as more 
direct measures of market power.  The theory depends on observed 
differences in cost, quality, or other attributes among alternative 
firms.  Beyond that, it is relatively straightforward: firm A will lose a 
certain number of sales if it increases its own product price.  
Considering A alone, that price increase could be unprofitable.  But 
suppose that a high percentage of those lost sales go to firm B, which 
produces a reasonably close substitute.  If these B sales were added 
back in (“recaptured”) the price increase could be profitable.  For 
purposes of market definition, we would express that conclusion by 
saying that A and B are essential components of a “hypothetical 
monopolist,”42 which means that A standing alone is not a 
 
42Some courts and writers speak of a “hypothetical cartel,” which 
confers the same meaning.  See, e.g., FTC v. Wilh. Wilhelmsen 
Holding ASA, 341 F.Supp.3d 27, 47 (D.D.C. 2018).  See also David 
Glasner and Sean P. Sullivan, The Logic of Market Definition, 83 
ANTITRUST L.J. 293, 314 n. 95 (2020). 
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monopolist but A plus B together might be.43  As a result, A and B 
are in the same relevant market.44 If the two were owned by the same 
firm or organized into a cartel their joint price increase might be 
profitable even though A’s price increase acting alone was not.  
Depending on the substitution differences between AB and other 
firms in the market, as well as the two firms’ margins, this could also 
warrant challenging a merger of A and B under the theory of 
“unilateral effects.”45 
A vertical merger can work the same way: it can facilitate a 
price increase when it enables revenues that might otherwise be lost 
from a price increase to be recaptured through the increased sales of 
the acquired firm.46 Indeed, one of the approaches taken in the 
 
43On this reasoning in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, see 
Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Merger Guidelines: from Hedgehog to Fox in 
Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 90-91 (2010).  See also Daniel P. 
O’Brien and Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial 
Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 
ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 573 (2000).  For evaluating mergers, the theory 
goes back at least forty years.  See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, The 
1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical 
Monopolist Paradigm, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 253 (2003).  However, it 
would work equally well for antitrust practices other than mergers. 
44For explanation of the antitrust Agencies’ approach, see U.S. 
Department of Justice and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §4.1.3 
(2010), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-
guidelines-08192010.  See also Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 
Recapture, Pass-Through, and Market Definition, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 
585 (2010) 
45See, e.g., United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F.Supp.2d 36 
(D.D.C. 2011) (applying this theory).  See also 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA 
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶913-915 (4th ed. 2017); 
Shapiro, supra note __; O’Brien and Salop, supra note __. 
46See Steven C Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 
127 YALE L.J. 1962 (2018); Serge Moresi and Steven C. Salop, 
VGuppi: Scoring Unilateral Price Incentives in Vertical Mergers, 79 
ANTITRUST L.J. 185 (2018). 
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Vertical Merger Guidelines is as a variant of the hypothetical 
monopolist test used for market definition. 
 For example, suppose an automobile manufacturer acquires a 
firm that produces automobile bodies and sells them to several 
automobile producers.47  After the acquisition the automobile body 
firm, now owned by the automobile manufacturer, raises the price of 
bodies. As a result, some competing automobile manufacturers 
switch away and purchase automobile bodies from another supplier. 
Assume that prior to the acquisition this price increase would 
have been unprofitable to the body manufacturer alone – the number 
of lost sales was too great in comparison with the price increase.  
Subsequent to the merger, however, some customers respond to the 
autobody price increase by switching to the acquiring automobile 
manufacturer.  In that case some of the losses that would have 
accrued to the body manufacturer as an independent entity are 
recaptured in increased sales of automobiles.  This recapture may be 
sufficient to make the price increase profitable. 
The government used this theory in its unsuccessful challenge 
to AT&T’s acquisition of Times-Warner (TW).48 AT&T is a 
distributor of cable and satellite TV services to its various 
subscribers. It owns DirecTV as well as some smaller cable 
television companies. TW is a very large owner of digital media, 
which it licenses to digital programming distributors such as AT&T.  
Digital programming is non-rivalrous, which means that each digital 
 
47The facts are hypothetical but are adopted loosely from the General 
Motors/Fisher Body merger, which occurred in 1926.  For opposing 
views of the acquisition, see Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors 
and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J. L. & ECON. 105 (2000); Ronald H. 
Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J. L. & 
ECON. 15 (2000).  One difference between the hypothetical and the 
real situation is that prior to their merger Fisher and GM apparently 
dealt only with one another. 
48United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F.Supp.3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018), 
aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C.Cir. 2019). 
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copy can be licensed out an indefinite number of times. It is also 
subject to significant product differentiation and there are large 
differences in marginal value among content suppliers. TW owns 
titles such as the Harry Potter movie series and Wonder Woman that 
are not only highly desirable, but no one else has them.  An 
independent TW would have no incentive to deny programing to 
anyone willing to pay its price, which would be the profit-
maximizing rate for free standing TW.  In that case TW’s profit 
maximizing strategy would be to license to all takers, perhaps with 
some price discrimination to the extent that its customers had 
differing demand elasticities.49   
After the merger things change, however.  The new owner of 
TW, AT&T, also owns distribution assets.  If AT&T/TW raises the 
license price for some of its media or simply blocks licensing to some 
third-party carriers TW will still lose sales, but some of that lost 
revenue would be recaptured to the extent that it induces customers 
to switch to an AT&T firm as distributor.  TW is not like one out of 
ten appliance stores in an area that might be reasonably good 
substitutes for one another.  Rather, for many of its titles there are no 
good alternatives.  Current customers of Dish Network might respond 
to higher fees or a blackout of desirable TW titles by switching to 
DirecTV, which AT&T owns.50  Whether that tradeoff is profitable 
and by how much is an empirical question, and depends on the 
diversion rate at which subscribers will switch; but it also indicates 
 
49The cost of licensing is virtually zero and supply is unlimited.  As a 
result the optimal strategy would be to license to every potential 
customer at a price equal to the inverse of its elasticity of demand.  
E.g., W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to 
Accept: How Much Can They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 635 
(1991). 
50 See, e.g., Final, Corrected Brief of Appellant, United States v. 
AT&T, No. 18-5214, 2018 WL 5099066 (D.C.Cir. Oct. 18, 2018), 
*16, *48 (after the merger AT&T could use blackouts to switch 
subscribers to DirecTV or other AT&T outlets); id. at 68 (speaking of 
these switchers as the “diversion rate”). 
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that AT&T/TW’s profit-maximizing price following the merger 
would be higher than it had been prior to the merger.  The “where the 
effect may be substantially to lessen competition” language of §7 of 
the Clayton Act is triggered by a probable price increase caused by 
the merger.51 
This theory also works for some contractual relationships as 
well, although to the best of my knowledge no court has applied it.  
One of Ronald Coase’s contributions to law and economics was the 
insight that anything that can be accomplished within a firm can be 
specified with a properly designed contract.52 A vertical control 
agreement can harm competition when it enables a firm to 
“recapture” revenues from a price increase that it would otherwise 
have lost.  In order to work, a contractual arrangement would have to 
force a price increase (or quality decrease) that would ordinarily be 
unprofitable, but that the firm would be able to recapture as a result 
of its contractual relationship with another firm. 
 One contractual tool for this purpose is most-favored-nation 
(MFN) clauses, which are contractual provisions that specify the 
minimum price that a contracting partner must charge to third parties 
in competition with the principal firm.53  For example, the 
automobile manufacture in the previous illustration might enter a 
long-term contract with the automobile body manufacturer that also 
requires the body manufacturer to charge higher prices to the 
automobile manufacturer’s competitors. This could induce customers 
to switch to the automobile manufacturer’s automobiles, thus 
 
51See Moresi & Salop, supra note __. 
52See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 
(1937); and steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 
26 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1983). 
53See, e.g., Silverman v. Amazon, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-01256 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 11, 2021), 2021 WL 528598 (class action complaint alleging 
Amazon’s unlawful use of MFN clauses in ebook sales).  See iId., ¶3 
(result of MFN clauses is that the plaintiff class must pay more for 
ebooks purchased on alternative platforms). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793733
2021 Vertical Control 19 
 
recapturing lost profits elsewhere. The body manufacturer would 
have to be compensated for its lost profits from the high prices 
charged to the rivals, but to the extent the strategy is profitable to the 
auto manufacturer it will be able to share its profits and the two will 
reach a joint maximizing solution.54 
In a case involving a firm such as Amazon and ebooks,55 an 
MFN agreement might force prices to be higher on non-Amazon 
ebook sites.  This would serve to protect Amazon’s own higher 
margins and, if necessary, enable Amazon to compensate the 
publishers for losses of revenue on other sites.  While this outcome 
could be accomplished by means of a vertical merger between 
Amazon and ebook publishers, it could also be accomplished through 
a sufficiently specified contract. 
Power and Effects 
 The metered foreclosure and recapture strategies outlined 
here depend on rates of substitution or response to price changes that 
traditional market definition approaches to power fail to capture.  
That is not surprising.  The tools of market definition were developed 
 
54See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 2 J. L. & ECON. 
1 (1960). 
55See Amazon Compl., supra note __, ¶3 (alleging that the MFNs 
make it more difficult for rival book sellers to compete with 
Amazon); ¶¶82-83: 
Because of Amazon's market power in the Relevant Market, 
these contractual requirements prevent Amazon's actual and 
potential rivals from offering lower prices or promotions, 
introducing different business models, or developing 
innovative products. One competitor told the Committee that 
the effect of Amazon's MFN and related provisions is that 
publishers “raise the price on competitor sites to match 
Amazon's price.” In other words, Amazon uses the MFN and 
related provisions to raise prices not only on its own platform, 
but also on platforms that it does not control. 
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prior to the time that empirical methodologies for measuring 
marginal substitution rates, or elasticities, came into vogue.56 
 Because of its binary nature, traditional tools that estimate 
market power by reference to a relevant market work very poorly for 
this purpose. They can count something as inside the market or 
outside but cannot meter gradations.  For example, if several 
potential vertically related trading partners have different costs or 
other measures of desirability, any approach that depended on 
placing them in a relevant market for measurement of foreclosure 
would put them either inside or outside, but it could not meter 
anything in between.  Of course, a court might conduct a separate 
fact finding to the effect that the acquired or obligated firms were 
better placed than rivals, but this alone would not enable it to 
quantify the results. 
 The better approach is to start out with the pair of firms 
subject to a merger, or whose conduct is governed by an exclusionary 
contract provision.  The question whether this pairing will result in a 
price increase depends on how the arrangement limits the 
opportunities of alternative firms, whether upstream or downstream.  
This is a function of the extent to which a merger or contracting 
partner has cost or placement advantages over the next best placed 
firms.  If we can produce these numbers for a small number of best 
placed firms, the definition of a broader relevant market adds 
nothing. 
If we cannot produce them with any degree of reliability, then 
defining markets and measuring shares is a poorer alternative, 
although at that point we may have no choice.  That is, market 
definition approaches should be the fall back when more direct 
measures are unavailable. 
 
56For pioneering work in this area, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, 
ECONOMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. 
AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW (2014).  See also Louis Kaplow, On the 
Relevance of Market Power, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (2017). 
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Other Practices that Obscure Market Boundaries 
Vertical practices are not the only ones that jump traditional 
market boundaries, although the facts are often buried in questions 
about market definition, which incidentally also distorts the analysis. 
Consider the Continental Can decision, which condemned the 
merger of a manufacturer of metal food cans with a maker of glass 
jars.57  After finding that there were some markets in which cans and 
bottles competed, including baby food, soft drinks, and beer, the 
Court lumped cans and bottles into one market and condemned the 
merger in an aggregated can/bottle market.  In a different legal 
context, and with a different outcome, the decision in the DuPont 
(Cellophane) case declined to condemn DuPont of monopolization 
after lumping cellophane, waxed paper, wrapping paper and metal 
foil together into a single market for “flexible packaging materials.”58 
In both of these cases, simply lumping the diverse products 
into a single market was mistaken.  The issue in DuPont was more 
difficult than the one in Continental Can, however.  Both would have 
done better to apply a version of the recapture analysis described 
previously.  The question in Continental Can was whether there was 
some grouping of sales for which the merger would have led to a 
price increase.  For example, standalone Continental’s ability to raise 
its price to beer producers59 may have been limited by the 
competition of Hazel-Atlas’ glass bottles.  Continental would lose too 
many sales. To the extent those purchasers defected to Hazel-Atlas, 
however, the merger would enable Continental to recapture them, 
perhaps making its price increase profitable.  This process may have 
to be repeated for other uses for which cans and bottles were viable 
alternatives. 
 
57 United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). 
58United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & co., 351 U.S. 377 
(1956).  See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note __, ¶539. 
59 For this analysis we assume that Continental had the power to price 
discriminate between different types of can customers. 
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The issue in DuPont is more difficult to address for two 
reasons.  First, in a monopolization case the substitution query may 
have to be applied to a larger number of firms than a single merger 
partner. Whether cellophane enjoyed substantial market power 
depended on its substitutability with multiple candidates.  These 
included all of the proffered alternatives – namely, wax paper, 
glassine, brown wrapping paper, tin foil, and so on, starting with the 
closest rival.  Each alternative that met the hypothetical monopolist 
requirement should be included in the market until the alternatives 
were exhausted or the defendant’s share was too small to sustain a 
monopolization charge. 
Second, the Court would have to be satisfied that substitution 
was not observed because DuPont was already selling cellophane at a 
significant markup above its costs – the well-known “Cellophane 
fallacy” problem.60 Answering that question will involve 
econometrics rather than market definition.  Measurement tools are 
available for determining the extent to which a firm’s prices exceed 
its costs.61 Addressing the markup question directly may dispense 
with the need to define a relevant market.  That is, a high price/cost 
margin is itself evidence of significant market power.  That may be 
all that is needed in situations where the legal standard does not insist 
on a market definition as a mechanism for establishing power. 
 
60 On the problem, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §3.4 (6th ed. 
2020). 
61 See Steven Berry, Martin Gaynor, and Fiona Scott Morton, Do 
Increasing Markups matter? Lessons from empirical Industrial 
Organization, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 44 (2019) (noting recent 
improvements in the theory for measuring price/cost margins).  See 
also Chad Syverson, Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, 
Implications, and Open Questions, 33 J. ECON.  PERSP. 23 (2019) 
(comparing various approaches).  And see Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a 
Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714 (2018) (emphasizing 
study of individual markets in order to assess market power). 
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 Evaluating vertical control mechanisms requires an 
understanding of how a challenged structure (whether in property or 
contract) changes the constraints under which parties bargain. In a 
well-functioning market two bargaining partners will maximize any 
value that is jointly available.  While that proposition is naturally 
associated with the Coase Theorem,62 it is in fact far broader and 
covers all situations in which contracting parties are able to reach an 
agreement.63 
An important corollary, however, is that agreements may be 
joint maximizing precisely because they create monopoly. Cartels are 
the most visible example of this, but there are others.64  Legal rules 
sometimes constrain firms’ ability to make profit-maximizing deals 
because those deals, once made, injure competition.65  In such cases, 
understanding how a restraint or acquisition affects particular 
bargaining relationships can tell us much more than any information 
concerning the overall relevant market in which the firms operate. 
 
62E.g., Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 ECON. 
PERSP. 113, 123 (1987); Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEG. 
STUD. 1, 4 (1982) 
63E.g., Daniel F. Spulber, Complementary Monopolies and 
Bargaining, 60 J. L. & ECON. 29 (2017). 
64See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note __, Ch. 
4. 
65In the context of patent law, see Erik Hovenkamp, Competition, 
Inalienability, and the Economic Analysis of Patent Law, 21 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV.33 (2018). 
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